Braskem multi-agent handoff

Prepared for a fresh Claude multi-agent negotiation. Public-information cutoff: 2026-08-15.

Files

  • petrobras.md - Petrobras incentives, constraints, opening and red lines.
  • braskem-management.md - management/board position and operating case.
  • ig4.md - Shine I/IG4 control-investment position.
  • creditors.md - deliberately hostile bondholder/financial-creditor position.
  • brazil-political-context.md - common election, industrial-policy, Petrobras-governance and Alagoas overlay.

Each role file is self-contained. Agents should independently form opening positions before reading or responding to the other agents' proposals.

All agents must then read brazil-political-context.md. It is a shared overlay, not a fifth negotiating party. Its central implication is an election-year double bind: an overt Petrobras bailout is politically and legally difficult, while a disruptive RJ or foreign-led creditor takeover also carries jobs, supply-chain and national-control costs. This raises the probability of a capped, shared, commercially documented rescue; it does not create a government guarantee.

Common factual baseline

  • Shine I FIP/IG4: 50.11% voting / 34.32% total capital. Petrobras: 47.03% voting / 36.15% total. Others: 2.86% voting / 29.53% total.
  • At 2026-06-30, Braskem reported corporate gross debt of US$10.3B, adjusted net debt of US$9.5B, leverage of 6.74x, and certain debt defaults beginning in July.
  • Q2 recurring EBITDA was US$1.043B; Brazil/South America contributed US$869M and Brazilian cracker utilization was 70%.
  • Q2 working capital consumed US$547M, leaving US$385M operating cash flow and approximately US$210M recurring cash generation. Braskem attributed the outflow to higher feedstock and product prices, higher inventory volumes, and reduced payment arrangements. The price and volume components are balance-sheet level changes, not a recurring quarterly run rate if naphtha and inventory stabilize. The supplier-finance and LC components are more persistent.
  • The June 25 company proposal requested five-year maturity extensions, 100% PIK through December 2028, a 200bp coupon reduction, no principal haircut/equitization, no fixed-asset collateral, and a US$1.5B LC facility consisting mainly of approximately US$1.3B rolled LCs plus US$200M incremental commitments.
  • The creditor steering committee rejected that proposal as negative-NPV and demanded shareholder burden-sharing, positive-NPV compensation, collateral optionality and cash-use guardrails.
  • A São Paulo court granted a 60-day enforcement stay to invited mediation creditors on June 26. It was temporary and did not eliminate all contractual default consequences.
  • Braskem Idesa is separately in default; its US$900M 2029 notes and US$1.2B 2032 notes may be handled through Chapter 11. Do not automatically consolidate Mexico debt into the Braskem S.A. restructuring model.
  • Remaining recognized Alagoas provision at June 2026 was approximately R$3.2B, but ultimate cost may differ materially.

Important spread correction

Do not treat Braskem's June normalization forecast as observed August market data. The Q2 presentation was filed August 14 but states that it was updated as of June 30. Its 3Q/2027 spread forecast reflects that information set.

Public Platts reporting for the week ended July 22 showed most Americas PE prices stable or increasing, including broadly stable CFR Brazil grades. The user states that PE-naphtha spreads remained strong into mid-August. Agents should therefore model both:

  1. Persistent-spread case: 2026 EBITDA approximately US$2.7-3.3B. Cash generation can improve materially after the initial working-capital reset even without a full reversal, provided naphtha prices and inventory volumes stabilize. Model a range from flat operational working capital to management's US$518M H2 release rather than repeating Q2's US$547M outflow. The US$518M figure is visually verified from the June plan page: July is US$57M, not the US$87M produced by OCR.
  2. Normalization case: 2027-28 EBITDA around Braskem's June plan of approximately US$1.5B.

The negotiation must not annualize Q2 blindly, but it also must not assume that the June forecast had already occurred by mid-August.

Current mediator base case

This is a reference, not a required consensus:

ItemCurrent estimate
Near/intermediate maturity extension5 years
PIK/reduced cash-interest period2 years
Interest during relief4% cash + about 4% PIK
Coupon afterwardExisting coupon +2%
New WC/LCAbout US$1.1B
Petrobras contributionAbout US$550M
IG4 contribution/backstopAbout US$275M
Creditor new moneyAbout US$275M
Creditor warrants15% fully diluted
Existing equity retained85% fully diluted
Principal haircut0% initially
Excess-cash sweep50% above US$1.0B minimum liquidity

Warrants could step up to 22.5% if cash conversion, EBITDA, liquidity or PIK milestones are missed. The lower upfront grant reflects the corrected working-capital premise; the step-up protects creditors if better operating conversion does not appear.

Local evidence

  • .context/june25shared.txt and .context/june25ocr/ - June 25 cleansing materials.
  • .context/q2release.txt - Q2 earnings release.
  • .context/q2pres.txt - Q2 presentation.
  • .context/q2itr.txt - Q2 interim statements and notes.

Key public sources

Negotiation protocol

  1. Each agent states an opening package and rejection terms independently.
  2. Run at least three rounds: openings, counteroffers, final compromise.
  3. The creditor agent must remain adversarial and test whether sponsor funding is truly loss-absorbing.
  4. Distinguish percentage dilution from value destruction and separately show dilution for shareholders who do and do not subscribe to a rights offering.
  5. Quantify leverage at annual EBITDA of US$1.5B, US$2B, US$2.5B, US$3B and US$4B.
  6. Reject a consensus if any party is economically better off choosing its realistic alternative.